In the United States, World War II and its aftermath fostered deepened and expanded connections between the military and industry. This well-known social transformation has been a centerpiece of Cold War historiography. A substantial literature exists on the relation of the military-industrial complex to national politics, broad features of the industry, and individual programs. Much less attention has been devoted to how corporations (critical loci for accomplishing complicated technical project in the U.S. and other nations), in concert with their government partners, organized technical expertise and knowledge production.
This paper analyses the history of the commercial aircraft industry in the two German states in relation to the Cold War and detente.
Up to 1955, post-war restrictions prohibited aircraft production in both German states. After 1955, as new legal and policy frameworks were implemented, both states sought to re-establish a strong commercial aircraft industry—an industry that had thrived before the war. But each state pursued this objective in a separate way, reflecting different technical resources, alternative approaches to government support, and different industry structures.
In East Germany, the state made aircraft production an important priority and subsidized it to a greater degree than in the West. For the east, aircraft production was an important sign of modernity and for competing with the West in technological progress. Too, such production was integral to socialist ideas on modern public transport systems. Lastly, engineering concepts and technical knowledge had more influence on political decisions than in the West.
In West Germany, government subsidized aircraft industry in a more cautious way. Only after the crash of the East German aircraft industry in 1961 did West German Government become more active in stimulating its aircraft industry. In its last years, even the East German government started to buy aircraft from West German industry.
US dominance in aerospace technology shaped the international business landscape. Successful commercial ventures required an international market and the US position precluded this possibility in key areas. Thus, as an early strategy, West German industry sought to exploit technological niches (such as VTOLs and commuter aircraft) in which it might succeed. But all projects more or less failed. In the 1970s, West Germany joined with Britain and France to create Airbus to compete with US commercial aircraft producers. Airbus’ emergence highlighted the need for Europe to pool technical resources and knowledge, the symbolic value of the aircraft as an indicator of technological pre-eminence, and as a focus of international relations. For this latter period, this paper will examine the German role in Airbus and how the change in international relations that came with détente and the end of the Cold War benefited the new company.